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Comparative Law and Private International Law

I. Comparative law
Comparative law was traditionally defined narrowly as the comparison of different legal
systems. Today, it is understood more broadly as that academic discipline that deals with
the diversity and plurality of legal systems. This encompasses three strands. The first one is
the comparison of legal rules and orders of different legal systems, including the
recognition, explanation and sometimes evaluation of similarities and differences, and, if
desired, the determination of the better law. A second strand of comparative law is
dedicated to analysing the mutual interactions and influences between legal orders –
especially through so-called legal transplants. A third strand, finally, concerns the
development of a general understanding of law and legal theory on the basis of individual
legal phenomena. All these strands exist both in a pure and an applied variant. Whereas
pure comparative law analyses aims merely at the acquisition of knowledge, applied
comparative law wants to make such knowledge useful for projects of adjudication and
legislation (either legal harmonisation and unification, or domestic law reform).
Just as comparative law encompasses a variety of strands, it also encompasses a variety
of methods. Comparative law was once confined to the comparison of black letter rules.
This was followed by calls for functional comparative laws: legal rules and institution
should be compared with regard to their functions, and two institutions are functionally
equivalent and thus comparable if they fulfil the same function, even if they are doctrinally
different. In addition, and sometimes opposition, much contemporary comparative law is

Ralf Michaels
Forthcoming in Elgar Encyclopedia of Private International Law

cultural, paying close attention to the local meaning of legal rules, their embeddedness in a
society’s culture and values.
Comparative law scholars thought for some time that the mere exposition of foreign
law is not yet comparative law but rather mere collection of information. Nowadays, it is
more and more acknowledged that the recognition and understanding of foreign law itself
already imply a necessarily comparative approach, and thus comparative law competence.
With its focus on the plurality of legal system, and an attention towards their
interactions and equivalences, comparative law displays obvious parallels with private
international law. Practical application of private international law always engages at least
two legal systems—that of the forum, and a foreign one. In this sense at least, private
international law will frequently require some of comparative law. An analysis of the
specific interactions between comparative law and private international law goes beyond
this general truth and provides insights relevant for both disciplines.
Although the connections between private international law and comparative law are
manifold, they can be grouped. This article follows a trichotomy first proposed by Ernst
Rabel: comparative private international law (II.), comparative law in the application of
private international law doctrines (III.), comparative law as the basis of private
international law (IV.)

II. Comparative private international law
1. Scholarship
As long as different countries have different systems of private international law, these
systems and their rules can be the object of comparison like any other domestic law. In
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private international law scholarship, comparison has always been prominent (though far
from universal), more so perhaps than in other areas of law, no doubt because its
international focus made comparisons more intuitive. Techniques like renvoi,
characterization, etc., were developed in one legal system and then adopted by others. Such
comparative studies culminated in Ernst Rabel’s big treatise on comparative private
international law. The Instituto italiano di studi legislativi edited, between 1937 and 1956,
a collection called ‘Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto internazionale privato’.
Comparative private international law plays a prominent role in various leading
publications, like Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht and
the Yearbook of Private International Law. Today, contemporary treatises contain
comparative treatments, though to different degrees – more so in Germany and Switzerland
than in France or the United States ( USA (including Louisiana and Oregon)), for example.
For a long time, there have been attempts to formulate general principles of private
international law on the basis of comparison. Such formulation has been made more
difficult after the rise of the radically different approach to private international law in the
US; it has become less interesting to Europeans since their attention has been captured,
almost exclusively (and somewhat parochially), by the creation of European private
international law. Nonetheless, proposals to develop general principles of private
international law, are still being made, most recently under the aegis of UNIDROIT in
Rome and the Hague Conference on Private International Law, at least as regards choice of
law.

2. Comparison of foundations and individual rules
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Such comparison shows not only great differences in individual rules of private
international law. It also demonstrates that private international law, more so than other
disciplines, rests on very different foundations as between different legal systems. In the
common law tradition, especially in the US, private international law is based strongly on
ideas of sovereignty. Questions of private international law become questions of mediating
the powers and regulatory interests of different sovereigns. Private international law deals
with actual conflicts of laws; its job is to determine first whether a conflict actually exists,
and then to resolve it. The dominant legal technique is one of broad standards and
principles; justice in the individual case is often prioritized over ex ante predictability.
In a continental European tradition, by contrast, questions of private international law
have traditionally been viewed in closer proximity to private law; the aim is to determine
the law that is most appropriate for the parties ( Private International Law, concept and
purpose). Here, predictability and uniformity of result are sometimes considered more
important than the proper decision in the individual case, although escape clauses enable
judges to account for the need for justice in the individual case. The dominant technique is
often that of precise formal rules, though experience has shown that the application of such
rules in concrete cases still leave much decision to the adjudicator.
Of course, this contrast is overdrawn – in every system of private international law there are
public and private concerns. Also, the contrast is overly simplistic; it does not account for
the peculiarities of other legal traditions (though it seems fair to see that a civil law
conception and a common law conception have been the most influential in the world).
Finally, private international law is a discipline that has traditionally seen an unusually high
level of theoretical and foundational differences of views even within legal traditions.
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These foundational differences account for the persistence of differences in rules between
legal systems.

3. Application of comparative private international law
Comparison of different national solutions has been especially important for the creation
and application of unified private international law. The Hague Conference, the prime
institution aimed at such treaties, relies, in its work, on extensive comparative research.
Nonetheless, foundational differences between legal traditions have frequently led to
different understandings. This became obvious for the Hague Conventions on Evidence and
on Service, both of which some Europeans viewed as exclusive, whereas US American
viewed them as supplementary. Negotiations towards a Hague Judgments Convention
failed largely because negotiators had very different conceptions of what such a treaty
should achieve.
Similarly, the European legislator, which has to combine different national approaches,
must resort to comparative law. In doing so, it has often prioritized continental European
over English understandings (especially in the area of jurisdiction), which has led to
problems and frustration in England.
Likewise, domestic lawmakers have made frequent use of comparative law. No modern
codification of private international law is written without surveying foreign models.
Sometimes, such codifications, especially outside of Europe, seem to follow these models
so closely that they sometimes deal more with problems emerging in Europe than with
those in their own systems.

Ralf Michaels
Forthcoming in Elgar Encyclopedia of Private International Law

Judges also sometimes use comparison to develop choice of law solutions to new

questions of private international law. For a long time, when private international of law
was judge-made law in most countries, such comparative use was especially useful and thus
frequent. Now that more and more private international law rules are codified, the use of
comparative law by judges seems to be in decline. An exception concerns the interpretation
of private-international-law treaties: here, a judge must frequently consider interpretations
given to the treaty in other member states, so the goal of uniform interpretation can be
achieved. Arbitrators, by contrast, sometimes compare different private international law
rules and the results of their application in order to designate the applicable law.
Finally, private parties (or, more precisely, their attorneys) must often engage in
sophisticated comparison of private international law regimes in order to make the right
decisions in issues of ( Forum (and law) shopping), and in Choice of forum and submission
to jurisdiction), and the structuring of transactions in accordance with one or the other legal
regime. Such use has become more relevant with the recent expansion of party autonomy.

III. Comparative law in the application of private international law doctrines
Comparative law is involved in the application of private international law doctrines. This
is obviously the case for such private international law methods that determine the
applicable law on the basis of the substantive content of different rules. By contrast,
traditional European private international law has often been described as involving a strict
two-stage test, according to which the applicable law is first determined without regard to
its content, and then applied without regard to the process by which it was determined. In
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reality, this dichotomy is untenable: comparison permeates almost all doctrines of European
private international law, too.

1. Characterization
Classification (characterization) is a classical area for comparative law. Against proposals
that characterization of foreign law rules had to occur strictly pursuant to lex fori or lex
causae, Ernst Rabel suggested a comparative characterization: concepts of private
international law should be characterized according to a universal understanding based on
the comparison of the different conceptions in different legal systems. Such a universalist
method has not ultimately prevailed, due to both practical and theoretical reasons.
However, even a judge who refuses such a universalist approach and characterizes
according to the lex fori will need to compare the concepts used in his own choice-of-law
rules with the institutions under foreign law. For example, characterization of the Islamic
figure of the mahr requires not only understanding in the Islamic context, but also a
comparison with domestic rules on contract, marriage, marital property, post-divorce
support, and succession law. Such comparison will often occur along teleological or
functional lines and thus benefit from the functional method as developed in comparative
law.

2. Renvoi
Renvoi is engaged with comparative law in several ways. The first, most obvious one, is
that renvoi requires engagement of foreign choice of law rules, and thus requires the judge
to properly understand and apply those rules. This can be especially problematic in the case
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of a hidden renvoi, which requires the judge to expand the scope of the foreign law. In
addition, comparison may be necessary, or at least helpful, should it be necessary to decide
on where to break a possible renvoi cycle. The English foreign court theory, according to
which the English judge should decide exactly as though he was a judge from the state
whose law has been designated as applicable by English law, is the most obvious example
in which a comparative approach is required. Finally, the existence of the renvoi problem
also points to problems that follow from differences between different choice of law
regimes, and thus to a mutual interest in unification of such regimes. Between two systems
with similar choice of law regimes, a renvoi problem cannot occur, because both systems
will designate the same law as applicable.

3. Determining the content of foreign law
As a consequence, determining the content of foreign law (Foreign law, application and
ascertainment) is, to some extent, a comparative law activity. Practitioners confronted with
foreign law in the context of a private international law analysis are well aware of this, and
of its difficulties: Max Rheinstein once found that of 40 private international law decisions
appearing in US casebooks, 32 involved a wrong application of foreign law, and although
applying foreign law has since become easier, it still presents challenges.
This means that comparative law insights are relevant for the process of determining the
content of foreign law. This begins with formulating the precise question, which often
occurs in the forum’s own legal system and is posed to a foreign legal system that may
operate in a different framework and with different concepts. Once the question has been
properly translated for the foreign law, the judge must try to understand foreign law on its
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own terms as much as possible, instead of seeing it through her own domestic lens and
concepts. This means especially that she must go beyond determination of the applicable
positive rules of the foreign law and must inquire how they are applied in practice.
Comparative law makes a similar plea for finding the law in action as opposed to the law in
the books.
Courts, especially in the common law world, routinely call on experts on foreign law,
though this costly procedure is not always necessary. Moreover, experts from the foreign
legal system are not always necessarily superior, as was nicely expressed by Rudolf
Schlesinger: asked whether he, a German émigré teaching in the US, really claimed to
know more about French law than a French professor, he responded: “No, but I can explain
it to the tribunal better.” (Robert S. Summers, Professor Schlesinger’s Memories, and a Bit
More, 28/2 Cornell Law Forum (Fall 2001) 10, 17).
When the content of foreign law cannot be established, judges routinely apply the lex
fori instead. Alternative have been proposed that would involve comparative law thought.
One would be to determine, and apply, a closely related law—that of a neighbouring
country, or a similarly situated country, or a country that was influential. Another is to
apply general principles of law instead, which are determined by comparative law.

4. Better law
Some private international law rules and approaches ask explicitly for a comparison
between different potentially applicable laws. This is certainly so for the “better law”
approach, which still plays a minor role in US private international law. Under this
approach, the applicable law should be the better of several potentially applicable laws.
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Better law is defined, typically, as “superiority of one rule of law over another in terms of
socio-economic jurisprudential standards” (Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 296 (1966))– in other words, as a
result of legal comparison.
Although European private international law rejects a better law approach, some of its
rules require some comparison, too. Sometimes, the choice between different laws (and
thus the comparison), for example between the place of conduct and the place of injury in
tort law, is left to one of the parties (usually the plaintiff.) This is the case, eg, in art 6(3)(b)
Rome II Regulation (unfair competition affecting more than one market) and art 7 Rome II
Regulation (environmental damage). Here, the plaintiff will likely compare simply on the
basis of expected outcomes.
In other areas, the choice must be made by the judge. For example, in contracts
between parties with unequal bargaining power (consumers, employers), a choice of law by
the parties cannot deprive weaker party of the protection afforded to it by the law that
would apply to the contract absent such a choice (arts 6(2)(2), 8(1)(2) Rome I Regulation).
Where the judge has to make the choice, the question is what criteria should count. Most
importantly, the question is whether the laws should be compared in their entirety, or with
regard to the result of their application in the particular case – a distinction resembling that
in comparative law between macro and micro comparison.

5. False conflicts
Governmental interest analysis looks at the content of the laws, but this does not mean that
it also requires explicit comparison. However, in contemporary versions of interest
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analysis, comparison plays a role. This is the case, first, for false conflicts. Under
governmental interest analysis, a false conflict exists in two situations: first, when only one
state is interested in the application of its own law; second, when all states’ policies
coalesce, so that application of one state’s law will further also the policies of the other
states. The latter situation in particular includes a necessary comparison: the judge is
required to compare the policies underlying the respective laws. Judges in practice are often
rather superficial in this process. On the one hand, in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman (486 U.S.
717 (1988)), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Kansas court’s rather daring assertion that
Kansas law was effectively similar to that of other states. On the other hand, in F. HoffmanLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, Justice Breyer considered a detailed comparison between US
and European laws of antitrust “too complex to prove workable” (542 U.S., 155, 168
(2004)) and thus refused to apply US law to foreign plaintiffs’ claims, even though US and
European antitrust policies are similar to a large degree. In reality, false conflicts analysis
without a proper comparison is meaningless.
A parallel issue arises in European private international law in the problem whether the
choice of law can be left open if all potentially applicable laws would lead to the same
result (the Dutch speak of an antikiesregel). Although courts sometimes like to speculate on
this question with often superficial analysis of the different laws, the question cannot be
properly answered without a detailed comparison of these laws. Such a detailed
comparison, if done properly, will often be so burdensome that deciding the choice of law
problem would be the lesser evil.

6. Comparative impairment
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Another area in which interest analysis requires comparison is in the resolution of true
conflicts, situations in which the judge must decide which of several laws, all of which ask
to be applied, should prevail. Brainerd Currie, ( Currie, Brainerd) the proponent of the
approach, explicitly rejected any comparison: for him, the lex fori should always apply if
the forum had an interest in its application, regardless of the content of the foreign law or
the strength of the foreign government’s interest in its application. Methods used by courts,
however, often require comparison, most obviously so courts in California which use a
method called comparative impairment. Here, the applicable law is the law whose policies
would be more impaired by its non-application. This process requires an explicit
comparison, and sometimes this comparison takes place along functional equivalence. For
example, in Tucci v. Club Mediterrannee, S.A. (107 Cal. Rptr .2d 401), the court decided
not to apply California’s requirement that employers should carry Californian workers’
compensation insurance, in order to avoid claims by their employers under tort law, with
regard to a workplace accident that happened in the Dominican Republic. The main
argument was that Californian policies were not significantly impaired because the
defendant held an insurance with a French insurer. (A European court might have applied
substitution.) From the perspective of comparative law, this suggests that the French insurer
was viewed as a functional equivalent of a Californian insurer.

7. Ordre public
Perhaps the most obvious use of comparative law in traditional private international law
takes place when a foreign law remains inapplicable, or a foreign judgment unrecognizable
( Recognition and enforcement of judgements), because the consequence of such
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application or recognition would be incompatible with the judge’s own law’s fundamental
principles ( Public policy (ordre public)).
It has been argued that the content of the ordre public itself has a comparative
component. Thus, it has been suggested that a legal order’s principles should not be
considered part of the ordre public if they are anomalous in comparison with foreign law.
Some go even further and ask that an ordre public be determined on a supranational level –
either European or even worldwide. Judicial practice mostly goes the opposite way: US
courts and lawmakers subsume the singularly wide protection of free speech under US law
as part of the country’s ordre public precisely because other countries do not provide
similar protection.
Once the ordre public’s content has been determined, the comparison of those
principles with the foreign law or judgment is a comparative law process. A functional
comparison can often be made useful here. For example, when the German Federal Court
of Justice was asked to recognize a Californian Judgment that included punitive damages,
the Court did not simply refuse recognition tout court as incompatible with the German idea
that punishment is the exclusive domain of public law. Instead, the Court asked to what
extent punitive damages fulfil functions that are fulfilled by other private law or procedural
devices in German law and suggested that insofar enforcement would not violate the
German ordre public (BGH 4 June 1992, BGHZ 118, 312).

8. Coordination of different laws: adaptation, transposition, substitution
After the content of the foreign law has been properly determined, its application can raise
new problems of comparative law. This is so because the adjudicator must coordinate the
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foreign law with other laws. Sometimes, coordination is necessary because the law
applicable to a situation changes over time, for example because a party changes her
nationality. Sometimes, coordination is necessary because more than one law is applicable,
and there is some inconsistency between these laws.
Private international law has developed a variety of techniques to deal with such
coordination: adaptation, transposition, and substitution. In all of these, the question is
whether the legal concepts from one legal order is sufficiently equivalent to the other. One
example concerns the question whether a Swiss notary public can be used to fulfil formal
requirements of German law (BGH 17 December 2013, BGHZ 199, 270). Another deals
with the similarities and differences between the Islamic kafala and Western adoption rules
(Cass civ 1re 10 Oct 2006, Bull civ. I no. 431, p. 370) . In all these cases, the judge has to
engage in a (functional) comparative exercise.

9. Substantive rules in private international law
Comparative law is necessary, finally, in attempts to develop specific substantive rules for
international transactions instead of applying the law of one state or the other. Broadly, two
variants of this approach are related to comparative law. In the first variant, the judge is
asked to create and apply a median solution between those of the different legal systems.
Without sophisticated use of comparative law, such a process will establish only an
arithmetic result, not a workable legal rule. Indeed, quite frequently comparison shows that
a median rule is not superior to that of either legal system in question.
In the second variant, rather than applying one of the affected laws or trying to find a
compromise between them, the judge instead resorts to some substantive law distilled from
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a comparison of all legal systems. Such an approach provided one justification for an
alleged lex mercatoria; it has been revived, at least in scholarship, for the area of
intellectual property. Whatever other benefits and problems may exist with such an
approach, the task of distilling a proper law from a comprehensive comparison of all laws is
a comparative law task of such enormous scope that it must necessarily go beyond the
ability of any one judge. Where judges attempt to formulate such a global law, more often
than not they fall back, knowingly or not, on their own substantive law.

10. Forum non conveniens
Comparison is necessary in the application of the forum non conveniens doctrine – the idea
that a court can refuse to exercise its own jurisdiction if it finds itself to be inadequate, and
an alternative forum to be both available and more appropriate. Determining the availability
of the alternative forum already requires an exercise of comparative law. Moreover,
determination of whether an alternative forum is adequate necessarily requires a process of
comparison. Courts have found that precise similarity is not required –even foreign legal
systems that do not offer cross-examination, jury trial, and pre-trial discovery, can still be
considered adequate from the perspective of a common law judge. Similarly, assessing
whether the alternative forum is significantly superior involves a process of comparison.
Such comparison involves factual elements – like the relative availability of evidence – but
also legal elements.

IV. Comparative law as the basis of private international law
1. The third school of comparative law

Ralf Michaels
Forthcoming in Elgar Encyclopedia of Private International Law

Yet in another way comparative law has been used for the development of private
international law. Franz Kahn suggested as early as 1900, a third school of private
international law that he also called the comparative method. This method is based on the
assumption that the substantive laws of different states represent the stuff of private
international law. Private international law, even where it is the positive law of one state,
can therefore not be developed on the basis of just that state’s substantive laws, as the
nationalist school of private international law does; this approach can only produce
unilateral private international law rules. Nor, however, is it possible to develop rules of
private international law in a sphere entirely detached from all substantive laws, as was
done in the so-called internationalist school. Instead, private international law rules must be
developed on the basis of a comparison of the world’s existing private law rules. The idea
was taken up and expanded later by Ernst Rabel, especially in the area of characterization
(see supra III.1.).
As attractive as it looks, the approach has been only moderately successful. The hope,
implicit in the method, that a comparatist method can transcend domestic policies, has
proven erroneous, both empirically and theoretically. Empirically, legislators still tend to
develop private international law rules in close parallel to the development of substantive
law rules. To name but one example, the German legislator adopted a private international
law provision for registered partnerships only when such registered partnerships were
accepted in German domestic law, just as though the choice of law problem could only
occur at that moment. It might be desirable if private international law rules were
developed more in view of the laws of other countries, but presumably, the political
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salience of issues that are not part of a country’s substantive law is not great enough in
most situations.
Theoretically, the idea that a private international law based on a comparison of the
respective substantive laws can transcend politics, seems implausible: although such an
approach can and should transcend the substantive policies of the individual laws, it merely
leads to the formulation and negotiation of specific choice of law policies and interests.

2. Private international law as applied comparative law
The shortcoming of the third school of private international law can be phrased differently:
even a comparative perspective can never be a truly neutral perspective; although the judge
is enlightened by the engagement with foreign law, he remains an officer of his own state,
situated within his own legal system. This insight parallels the recent shift in comparative
law from a functionalist to a culturalist perspective, paired with the insight that comparative
law is not a neutral discipline, that the comparatist is always situated and that her own
interests shape, inevitably, her analysis.
In this regard, private international law has lessons to teach comparative law. First,
private international lawyers are aware of their own situatedness and the inability to fully
transcend it; they are therefore experienced in dealing with this situation. Secondly, private
international lawyers inevitably confront foreign law in very concrete situations. They are
therefore forced to engage in very specific comparison, something that more careless
comparative lawyers sometimes eschew. Thirdly, private international lawyers cannot
confine themselves to an understanding of different laws in isolation; they are required to
coordinate these laws and thus understand them also in their interaction. Fourthly, private
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international lawyers must necessarily render a decision (resolve a true conflict): they must,
in the end, prefer the solution of one law over that of another. They are thus not only forced
to make a value decision between different laws (albeit one based on values found in the
private international law regime), but also to justify such a solution to the losing party.
It is therefore not much of an exaggeration to claim that what a private international lawyer
engages in is, ultimately, a form of comparative law that can be called applied comparative
law. The private international lawyer is engaged in all three strands of comparative law as
explained in the introduction: she must understand and compare different legal systems, she
must transplant solutions from foreign law into her own legal system, and she must
transcend the substantive law of any one given legal system in building an internationalist
perspective. Methodologically, she will often benefit from a functionalist perspective, while
being aware of her own situatedness within her own legal system. This is applied
comparative law, because it is done in the context of a particular litigation and situation, but
as such it is not inferior to academic comparison that can be more abstract.

V. Consequences
It should have become clear that comparative law and private international law are
intricately connected – not only in their objects (a plurality of laws), but also in their
application. Yet, although the connection between comparative law and private
international law is often mentioned in theory, it is not often operationalized in practice.
Comparative lawyers rarely pay attention to private international law at all. Private
international lawyers use insights from comparative law more rarely than they should. Both
disciplines could benefit more from each other than they presently do.
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As concerns the consequences for private international law, the judge is in multiple

constellations required, at least in theory, to engage in a sophisticated comparative law
analysis. Insofar, it is deplorable that private international law practitioners are often
insufficiently aware of modern insights in the discipline of comparative law, whether
methodological or substantive. It has often been suggested that the judge is incapable of
such an analysis, which must instead be exercised by scholars. Yet the judge’s inability to
fulfil a perfect comparison should not be enough reason for her to refrain from proper
comparison altogether.
Moreover, the requirements in practice are often less high than those in theory. Usually,
the judge need not compare solutions from all legal systems, but only from those that could
possibly be applicable. Sometimes, as in the alternative application of different laws,
comparison goes merely to the concrete result of application and does not require a more
comprehensive understanding of the foreign law. Sometimes, as in the ordre public
reservation, the comparison serves merely as the basis for what remains, to some extent, a
judgment call on whether the core of the forum’s legal order is endangered – here,
comparison needs not be exact (though it does need to be accurate). In addition, even in
systems in which questions of law are allocated to the judge, in reality, the parties and their
counsel will bear a significant part of the comparative law burden. Alternatively, the parties
can release the judge thereof, by choosing the lex fori as applicable law, or by agreeing that
the foreign law should be presumed to have a certain content.
Ralf Michaels
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